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Abstract
Using the universe of housing transactions in England and Wales in the last
twenty years, we document a robust pattern of history dependence in housing mar-
kets. Sale prices and selling probabilities today are affected by aggregate house
prices prevailing in the period in which properties were previously bought. We
investigate the causes of history dependence, with its quantitative implications for
the post-crisis recovery of the housing market. To do so we complement our analysis
with administrative data on mortgages and online house listings, which we match
to actual sales. We find that high leverage in the pre-crisis period and anchoring
(or reference dependence) both contributed to the collapse and slow recovery of
the volume of housing transactions. We find no asymmetric effects of anchoring
to previous prices on current transactions; in other words, loss aversion does not
appear to play a role over and above simple anchoring.
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1 Introduction
This paper documents a novel pattern of history dependence in house prices and trans-
actions. Specifically, aggregate house prices in the year a house was previously bought
influence the individual price at which the house sells next, as well as the probability that
the transaction takes place. The results are based on twenty million housing transactions
from England and Wales and are not driven by changes in the composition of the houses
transacted. We complement our analysis with matched administrative data on mortgages
and on-line house listings.
The effects of history dependence on house prices and the probability of sale can be
material. Consider two identical houses sold in 2014, one previously acquired in 2007,
when aggregate prices peaked and the other in 2001. On average, all else equal, the
house bought in 2007 will carry a premium of over 10 percent over the one bought in
2001. Moreover, the house bought in 2007 will sell, on average with a 15 percent lower
probability. (We control for tenure duration so the results are not driven by shorter
durations in the more recent period.)
History dependence in housing markets is clearly at odds with a frictionless model in
which the value of a house and its transactability depend exclusively on the future stream
of dividends (rental value) the property delivers.
A possible interpretation of the results is the notion of anchoring or reference de-
pendence, an idea that goes back to Tversky and Kahneman (1982) and builds on a
well-established result from laboratory experiments: in estimating the value of an asset
agents tend to show a bias that overweighs possibly irrelevant initial cues. In the context
of the housing market, sellers may give excessive weight to the price they paid (vis-a`-vis
the market evolution of prices) when posting new prices; if they bought at high prices,
this will lead to higher advertised prices and low time in the market. A competing ex-
planation is the so-called down-payment effect, a mechanism proposed by Stein (1995).
For repeat buyers, a large percentage of their down payment comes from the sale of their
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previous homes, and, importantly, a majority of home sales are to repeat buyers. Hence,
owners who bought at high prices will have, all else equal, limited home equity; they will
then have higher reservation prices and be less likely to sell than owners of comparable
houses bought at lower prices, as they have less money left after their property sale.
To disentangle the two mechanisms, we study a sample of properties previously bought
exclusively with cash, for which the down-payment effect should be muted. We find strong
evidence of anchoring in this cash-only sample both on prices and on selling probabilities.
Loss aversion, however, does not appear to have played a role over and above reference
dependence. First, only a small fraction of properties experienced losses during this
period. Second, for those properties that did lose value, no asymmetric effect is apparent
in the data: the effects of past prices on current prices and selling probabilities are similar
for gains and losses measured around the previous price benchmark.
We also find that leverage accentuates history dependence. We measure leverage both
along the extensive margin (whether the property was bought with a mortgage) and the
intensive margin (the loan-to-value ratio at purchase). This evidence is consistent with
a role for a down-payment effect.
Understanding history dependence is a first step to inform the design of policies aimed
at preventing or reacting to future crises. In the context of the UK economy, the post-
crisis period led to a collapse in the volume of transactions, illustrated in Figure 1.
Transactions reached their peak in 2007 and then declined sharply. Prices reached their
peak slightly afterwards, subsequently fell, and only after 2009 experienced a resurgence.
We investigate the quantitative implications of history dependence for the post-crisis
recovery of the housing market for different regions in England and Wales and measure
the relative strengths of the mechanisms at play.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relation with the
existing literature. Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the data and
documents the patterns of history dependence. It next studies the potential channels
underlying history dependence and their quantitative relevance across regions and over
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Figure 1: Monthly house prices and sales, England and Wales
Notes: The figure shows the monthly quality-adjusted average price and the monthly total
number of transactions in England and Wales over 1995-2014. Data are taken from the England
and Wales Land Registry and quality-adjusted through an hedonic regresison as described in
Section 4.
time. Section 5 contains a similar analysis on house listings on a major UK online property
portal matched to the database on actual property sales. Section 6 presents concluding
remarks. The Supplemental Appendix contains additional material to complement the
information in the text, as well as a disaggregated analysis of the England and Wales’
regional housing markets.
2 Literature
On conceptual grounds, our paper builds closely on the seminal contributions of Stein
(1995) and Tversky and Kahneman (1982), both providing the foundations for the under-
lying mechanisms behind history dependence that we analyze.1 On empirical grounds,
our paper relates to the seminal work of Genesove and Mayer (2001), who find strong
1Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) also explore the consequences of down-payment constraints in a
theoretical model.
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evidence of loss aversion in the context of the Boston condominium market between 1990
and 1997. The authors report significant effects of loss aversion on listing prices and time
on the market and no significant effects on transacted prices. They find a small role for
down-payment effects. Relatedly, Anenberg (2011) analyzes the San Francisco Bay Area
housing market and in contrast to Genesove and Mayer (2001), reports significant effects
of loss aversion on transacted prices. Unlike these two studies, we find that loss aver-
sion played a muted role in the England and Wales’ housing markets, not least because
the overall gains in values for most properties were positive during the period analyzed.
Moreover, for properties that registered losses, there is no evidence of asymmetric effects
on prices or selling probabilities vis-a`-vis gains. Also differently from these studies, we in-
vestigate the quantitative implications of history dependence and its underlying channels
on the aggregate volume transactions.
Despite the differences in scope and markets studied, our paper finds strong evidence
of anchoring, in line with Beggs and Graddy (2009), who study art auctions of Modern,
Impressionists, and Contemporary paintings in London and New York, (The authors do
not study selling probabilities.) Related to anchoring (or reference dependence), a strand
of the finance literature has found evidence for a disposition effect. In the context of
the stock market, people are more likely to sell stocks that are posting gains (Odean,
1998); Hong et al. (2016) find some suggestive evidence in the Singaporean condominium
market of a kink in the selling probability at zero gains consistent with realization utility
(Barberis and Xiong, 2012). Unlike these studies, we do not find evidence for a kink in
selling probabilities around zero gains.
In focusing on the role played by leverage in explaining economic activity, we join a
vast literature that has documented the adverse effects of financial frictions during the
crisis and post crisis recovery. (See, for example, Mian and Sufi, 2009, and the references
therein.)
The gyrations in the housing market of the recent years have stimulated a number of
studies on the relation between house prices and mobility, in which the role of mortgage
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financing and loss aversion is often critical. Two examples in that line of research are
Engelhardt (2003) and Ferreira et al. (2012) for the US economy. Their focus is on
household mobility with an eye on its labour market consequences. In this paper, we focus
specifically on housing sales, but clearly they would have repercussion for the mobility of
households.
In identifying history dependence, the paper relates to Beaudry and DiNardo (1991),
who document history dependence in the labor market. The authors take a standard
wage equation and show that the unemployment rate when the contract started is a
significant determinant of today’s wages. They interpret their findings as a result of wage
stickiness and insurance contracts (firms insure workers against fluctuations in income
over the business cycle). Their results have been replicated in a number of studies and for
different countries: for instance, Grant (2003) shows that the results hold for a different
period; McDonald and Worswick (1999) show they hold for Canada; and Devereux and
Hart (2007) for the United Kingdom.
A closely related set of studies in this literature focuses on the effect of market con-
ditions at the time of labor market entry. Kahn (2010) uses the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, whose respondents graduated from college between 1979 and 1989. She
estimates the effects of both national and state economic conditions at time of college
graduation on labor market outcomes for the first two decades of a career. Oreopoulos
et al. (2012) also shows that initial labor market conditions have long-term effects on the
earnings of college graduates and (less) on the earnings of noncollege workers. Contem-
poraneously, Moreira (2016) has documented history dependence in firms’ performance:
firms born during a boom tend to grow persistently faster.
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3 Identifying history dependence
The (log) house price is usually modeled as:
pit = Xiβ + δt + wit, (1)
where pit is the transaction price of house i sold at time t, Xi is a vector of housing
characteristics, δt is the aggregate house price level at time t, and wt is an idiosyncratic
error component which contains both unobserved property characteristics (time-varying
or time-invariant) and idiosyncratic price effects due to the features of specific transac-
tions.
To study history dependence we start by augmenting the standard hedonic regression
above with the house’s previous transaction price pis:
pist = Xiβ + δt + γpis + eit, (2)
where s denotes the period when the house was previously purchased. Clearly, in such
regression the coefficient γ is not informative about history dependence per se, as it may
be capturing unobservable property characteristics of the house not contained in Xi. To
isolate the effect of previous aggregate market conditions we decompose pis into δˆs, the
price index at time s, and pˆi0 = Xiβ + eis, the imputed price of the house at time 0,
the baseline period (1995 in our dataset); and include both terms in the equation. (To
simplify notation, we omit the subscript i and focus on a house evaluated at times t, s,
and 0, with t > s > 0.) The estimated equation becomes:
pt = Xβ + δt + γ1δˆs + γ2pˆ0 + et. (3)
By focusing on the aggregate component of past prices (δˆs), we sidestep the problem that
ps contains time-invariant unobservable characteristics that could bias our estimation;
7
these characteristics are now captured by the term pˆ0.
Figure 1 reveals that, for most of the sample period, England and Wales house prices
have been trending upwards. Keeping current sale year constant, such a trend leads to
a correlation between property tenure and past aggregate prices (δˆs). For instance, a
property that has been only two years with an owner will often have a higher δˆs than a
property that has been eight years with the same owner. We therefore also control for
the duration of the tenure (DURt), measured as the number of years between two sales.
Such variable has the added advantage of controlling for some time-varying unobserved
property characteristics such as depreciation. It is likely that depreciation follows a
nonlinear pattern; hence we allow for DURt to enter the regression non-parametrically
through a third-degree polynomial:
pt = Xβ + δt + γ1δˆs + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + εt, (4)
where the error is now denoted as εt to indicate that some time-varying characteristics
are controlled for.
Our coefficient of interest, γ1, could still be biased by other time-varying property
characteristics not captured by f(DURt), for instance if the likelihood of home improve-
ments and renovations is correlated with aggregate house prices (as in Choi et al., 2014).
To address this remaining threat, in the Appendix we show results where we restrict the
sample to (a) flats, as flats are less likely to change their value by a lot after a renovation
(their size, a critical determinant of price, usually cannot be altered) and (b) properties
that were bought new, because this greatly reduces the need for renovations.
When exploring the mechanisms behind history dependence, equation (4) can be
rewritten with a measure of gains (or losses) as the variable of interest:
pt = Xβ + δt + γ1GAINt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et, (5)
where GAINt = δˆt − δˆs is the difference in aggregate house prices between time t and
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when the property was bought. Not only does this allow us to distinguish between
potential gains and losses in the estimating equation—separating pure anchoring from
loss aversion—, it also provides a way to estimate the effect of gains and losses in a non-
linear, non-parametric way. We do so by splitting GAINt into equally-sized bins for the
different magnitudes of gains/losses (ie losses between -0.25 and -0.15 per cent, between
-0.15 and -0.05 per cent, and so on).
To measure the effect of history dependence on transaction probabilities, we start from
an equation similar to (4) but with a 0/1 indicator as dependent variable. This indicator
takes the value one when the property was sold in a given year, and zero otherwise. Using
this approach, a property appears in the dataset each year after its first registered sale
(before the first sale we do not observe DURt).
4 History dependence in transaction prices and sell-
ing probabilities
The first part of this section describes our main data source, the England and Wales Land
Registry (LR), which contains twenty years of residential transactions from January 1995
to December 2014. We explain how we compute our measure of local aggregate house
prices and how we construct our two estimation datasets—one to analyze transaction
prices and one to analyze selling probabilities. We then show the results for history
dependence and explore its quantitative relevance.
4.1 Data and summary statistics
The LR records all residential property transactions, with few exceptions:2 The dataset
contains close to twenty million sales for twenty years of data, that is, approximately
2The exceptions are listed at http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/market-trend-data/
public-data/price-paid-data, where a public version of the dataset is available. Most of the
excluded transactions refer to sales that were not for full market value, for examples a transfer between
parties on divorce.
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one million sales per year. For each sale, the LR contains the precise postcode, the
street name, the street number, and the apartment number if the property belongs to
a multi-unit building. The LR records three attributes of the property: its type (flat,
terraced, semi-detached, detached); whether the property is new; and the tenure type
of the property (freehold or leasehold). The variable Date of Transfer in LR is the day
written on the transfer deed, that is, the date of completion, when keys and funds change
hands.
Before analyzing history dependence, we use the LR to compute the aggregate level
of house prices needed to create the GAINt variable. We do so at the local authority
level, by running a regression such as (1) for each local authority (LA) in England and
Wales. Our dataset contains 348 LAs in England and Wales; LAs are larger than the
typical American municipality but smaller than the typical metropolitan area (Hilber
and Vermeulen, 2016). Figure A1 in the Appendix plots each of these indices grouped
by region.
Analysis of transaction prices The analysis of transaction prices presented in this
paper relies on the identification of repeat sales on the same property—we need informa-
tion on the previous purchase of a property to make inference about history dependence.
We consider two sales as happening on the same property when they share the same
postcode, street name, street number, apartment number (if any), and property type
(flat, terraced, semi, detached). The upper panel of Table 1 shows descriptive statistics
for the analysis of transaction prices and distinguishes between ‘sales’ and ‘properties’ to
highlight the role of repeat sales in the analysis. Figure A2 shows graphically the subset
of the LR that is effectively analyzed.
Table 1 displays statistics for three samples. The first sample, Sample 1, spans all
the years from 1995 to 2014. Moving to the right columns of Table 1 means restricting
attention to sales that happened in later years. We use these more restricted samples
because more information is available in later years. Since 2002, the LR dataset includes
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Table 1: Summary statistics, analysis of transaction prices
Notes: The analysis of transaction prices uses sales included in the England and Wales Land
Registry for the years 1995-2014. The first column contains information on all these sales.
The second column describes Sample 1 used in the analysis: it is made of all properties which
have at least two sales in the dataset, and excludes for each property the first of such sales.
(The first sale is used to include the previous price or the previous aggregate price index in the
regression.) The third column is similar to the second but only refers to properties whose first
sale took place after 2001, as for this sample we can tell whether the property was purchased
with a mortgage. Finally, the fourth column describes properties whose first sale took place
after March 2005 and can potentially be matched to the Product Sales Data (PSD), a dataset
of residential mortgages where we can identify the initial LTV with which a house was bought.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
Land Registry (sales with (sales with (sales with
(all sales, previous purchase previous purchase previous purchase
1995-2014) in 1995-2014) in 2002-2014) in 2005-2014)
Sales (N) 19,628,516 7,527,731 3,199,389 1,385,653
Properties 12,089,086 5,038,658 2,570,092 1,234,381
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 161,266 184,100 211,919 231,694
p1 18,500 25,250 40,000 50,000
p25 70,500 93,000 119,000 125,000
p50 124,500 145,000 165,000 176,500
p75 195,000 220,000 243,000 250,000
p99 755,000 825,000 925,000 1,095,000
Property type (%)
Flat 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.24
Terraced 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.32
Semi 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25
Detached 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.19
Lease 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.28
New 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Previous purchase price (ps)
Mean 122,338 170,955 202,007
p1 16,000 22,500 42,200
p25 55,000 95,000 120,000
p50 90,000 142,900 166,000
p75 154,000 205,000 235,000
p99 540,000 676,000 800,000
Log capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.41 0.18 0.04
p1 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19
p25 0.11 0.02 -0.03
p50 0.33 0.13 0.03
p75 0.67 0.29 0.10
p99 1.24 0.75 0.43
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 4.42 3.57 3.21
p1 0 0 0
p25 2 1 1
p50 4 3 3
p75 6 5 5
p99 16 11 8
Matched-in variables (mean)
Bought with mortgage 0.72 0.71
Bought with LTV>80% 0.25
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a variable (‘charge’) which indicates the use of a mortgage to purchase the property3—
hence we label as Sample 2 the subset of transactions whose previous purchase happened
after 2001. Since 2005, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has been recording
information on all owner-occupier mortgages into the Product Sales Database (PSD)—
hence we label as Sample 3 the subset of transactions that can be matched into the
PSD. These more restricted samples contain more flats and, therefore, more leasehold
properties.4 There are no new properties in these samples, as it is expected, since these
are part of repeat-sale pairs and the first purchase (which could refer to a new build) is
not part of the sample.
Given the aggregate movement in house prices shown in Figure 1, for most households
in England and Wales homeownership has produced gains rather than losses—as shown by
the descriptive statistics about GAINt in Table 1. Additional calculations, not reported
in the table, reveal that Sample 1 contains 489,542 sales with a loss in terms of LA
aggregate prices (out of 7.5 million transactions). Conditional on realizing a loss, the
average (log) loss is 6.9 percent; conditional on realizing a gain, the average (log) gain is
46.7 percent.
Analysis of selling probabilities To estimate the impact of history dependence on
a property’s selling probability (and, in aggregate, on the number of transactions) we
reshape and expand the dataset so that each house has an observation in each year since
its first appearance in the LR (its first sale after 1995). With 12 million properties and
20 years, the final extended datasets has over 120 million rows (the average property
appears for the first time in the middle of the sample, meaning that we can follow it for
ten years). To keep the empirical analysis manageable, we extract a 50 percent random
sample of the data. We create a variable, qit, which equals one if property i sells in year
t, and zero otherwise. We treat the first sale as missing because we do not observe DURt
3This variable is not available in the public dataset but can be purchased from the Land Registry.
4A leasehold is a tenancy arrangement by which someone buys a property for a limited number of
years, usually 99, 125 or 999. It is usually associated with flats. See Giglio et al. (2015) and Bracke et al.
(2016).
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Table 2: Summary statistics, analysis of selling probabilities
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the dataset used to analyze the selling proba-
bility of properties in any given year. The dataset is created by taking the LR samples (whose
descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1) and expanding them so that each house has an
observation in each year since its first appearance in the LR. (For the empirical analysis we
create a variable which equals one if property i sells in year t, and zero otherwise.) To keep
the computational burden manageable, for the analysis of selling probabilities we extract a 50
percent random sample of the data.
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
Property × year obs (N) 68,925,352 33,828,768 18,170,180
Sales 3,598,666 1,500,362 636,611
Properties 5,838,767 4,304,097 3,174,433
Sell prob (Sales/N) 0.05 0.04 0.04
Purchase price (ps)
Mean 122,404 172,412 204,951
p1 16,000 23,000 45,000
p25 55,000 96,000 123,760
p50 90,000 144,950 169,950
p75 154,500 208,000 238,000
p99 540,000 684,995 800,075
Log capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.41 0.14 0.01
p1 -0.17 -0.19 -0.20
p25 0.08 -0.00 -0.06
p50 0.29 0.09 0.01
p75 0.74 0.25 0.07
p99 1.28 0.73 0.39
Years since purchase (DURt)
Mean 5.83 4.48 3.67
p1 1 1 1
p25 2 2 2
p50 5 4 3
p75 8 6 5
p99 17 12 9
Property type (%)
Flat 0.16 0.19 0.20
Terraced 0.30 0.31 0.31
Semi 0.29 0.28 0.28
Detached 0.25 0.23 0.22
Lease 0.21 0.24 0.25
New 0.10 0.10 0.10
Matched-in variables (averages)
Bought with mortgage 0.73 0.74
Bought with LTV>80% 0.48
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before that observation.
4.2 History dependence measure
Transaction prices Table 3 contains regressions with the current sale price of a house
as the dependent variable. All regressions control for property type as measured by the
LR (flat, terraced, semi-detached or detached property; new or second-hand property;
property sold as leasehold or freehold) as well as the number of years elapsed since the
current sellers have bought the property (DURt). The regressions include year-by-local
authority fixed effects to control for average local prices. The Table has three pairs of
columns, each pair corresponding to a sample.
The first columns of each pairs show the results of regressing today’s prices on the
prices of previous purchases of the same properties. This is for descriptive purposes only,
since any coefficient on previous prices may be capturing the effect of unobserved property
characteristics rather than pure history dependence. As expected, the regressions yield a
large and significant correlation between current and past prices of the property.
The other columns explore the effect of past aggregate prices (δˆs). Column (3) and (4)
split the previous sale price (ps) into a part not related to the aggregate price level (the
baseline price, denoted as pˆ0)—which can be interpreted as the price the house would
have fetched in the baseline year, 1995—and δˆs. While the baseline price retains a large
and significant coefficient, also the effect on δˆs is negative and significant.
The effect indicates a 9 percent decrease of the sale price compared to another equiv-
alent house which was bought in a different period and realized half the gain.
Selling probabilities The goal of the transactions analysis is to investigate whether
the purchase price of a property affects the probability that a house sells in any subsequent
period. As anticipated in the methodology section, we use a linear model analogous to
equation (4) but with a binary dependent variable indicating whether the property was
sold in any given year. The lower panel of Table 3 shows the results for history dependence
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Table 3: History dependence regressions
Notes: The upper panel of the table reports results for the transaction price analysis and the
bottom half of the table reports results for the selling probability analysis. In each of the two
panels, the first row refers to a regression of the form yt = Xβ+δt+γps+f(DURt)+εt whereas
the other two rows refer to the regression yt = Xβ + δt + γ1δˆs + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + εt, where yt
is either the transaction price or a binary indicator of whether a transaction is taking place for
a given property in any given year (we omit the individual subscript i for simplicity). In the
first type of regression, the variable of interest is the previous purchase price of the property
(ps). In the second type of regression, the variable of interest is the level of aggregate local
house prices at the time of purchase (δˆs) and the inputed value of the property in 1995 (pˆ0) is
used as an additional control for housing quality (computed as pˆ0 = ps − δˆs). All regressions
control for property type as measured by the Land Registry (X: flat, terrached, semi-detached
or detached property; new or second-hand property; property sold as leasehold or freehold) and
for a nonparametric function (a third-degree polynomial) of the number of years between sales
(DURt). ‘Y×LA’ indicates year-by-local authority fixed effects (δt in the regression formula).
Standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered by year and local auhority.
Dependent variable: Transaction price (pt)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Previous price (ps)
0.687 0.708 0.825
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Idiosyncratic factor
(pˆ0)
0.755 0.761 0.844
(0.014) (0.022) (0.018)
Previous aggr.
factor (δˆs)
0.090 0.129 0.185
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 7,527,731 7,527,731 3,199,389 3,199,389 1,385,653 1,385,653
Dependent variable: Selling probability (qt)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Previous price (ps)
-0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Idiosyncratic factor
(pˆ0)
-0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Previous aggr.
factor (δˆs)
0.001 -0.014 -0.052
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 68,925,353 68,925,353 33,828,766 33,828,766 18,170,179 18,170,179
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in selling probabilities.
The coefficient on the previous price (ps) is -0.008 or -0.009 for all samples. These are
substantial effects since the average selling probability in the sample is 0.052 as shown
in Table 1. The coefficients on past aggregate prices (δˆs) indicate no significant effect in
Sample 1, but negative and significant effects in the more recent samples.
Robustness checks The two panels of Table A1 in the Appendix replicate the results
of the initial history dependence regressions for price and quantities using two subsamples:
flats and properties which were bought new. If anything, history dependence coefficients
are larger than in Table 3 for these more homogeneous subsamples.
4.3 Nonlinear effects and mechanisms
We now use the GAINt variable instead of δˆs and split this variable into different bins to
capture possibly nonlinear effects of history on current prices and transactions. (Negative
bin values indicate losses.) The upper half of Figure 2 shows the effect of gains and losses
on transaction prices.5 A loss is associated to a higher sale price and, in a symmetric way,
gains are associated to lower price sales. Interestingly, after a 35 percent gain the effect
stabilizes. Standard errors get bigger for larger gains because there are fewer properties
with such a long holding period. Moreover, for long tenures the collinearity between
GAINt and DURt increases substantially (only properties with a long holding period
experience capital gains of more than 100 percent).
The lower half of the Figure shows the effect of gains and losses on selling probabilities.
For losses and gains up to 35 percent we have a similar picture to the one above, albeit
with the sign reversed. Losses induce lower selling probabilities and gains higher selling
probabilities. Once again the effect flattens out and in fact diminishes for big gains (and
longer durations). Figure A6 replicates the same analysis with a probit regression (rather
5Table A2 and Table in the Appendix show the regression coefficients.
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Figure 2: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses
Notes: The charts show the coefficients and corresponding 95-percent confidence bands for the
k dummy variables associated with different gains/losses (GAINkt’s) in the regression yt =
Xβ + δt +
∑
k γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et, where yt is the transaction price (pt) in the
upper chart and an binary indicator of sale (qt) in the bottom chart (we omit the individual
subscript i for simplicity). The precise value of the coefficients is reported in Table A2 and A3
in the Appendix. As for the regressions reported in Table 3, all regressions control for property
type as measured by the Land Registry (X: flat, terrached, semi-detached or detached property;
new or second-hand property; property sold as leasehold or freehold) and for a nonparametric
function (a third-degree polynomial) of the number of years between sales (DURt). Regressions
have year-by-local authority fixed effects (δt in the regression formula) and standard errors are
double-clustered by year and local auhority.
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than an OLS regression) and displays similar results.6
Figure 2 contains coefficients from regressions on all three samples. All samples display
the same pattern, but larger and older samples have more coefficients because they span
a longer time period. This consistency between samples is in apparent contrast with
the different coefficients shown in Table 3. In fact Figure 2 makes it clear that the
discrepancies in Table 3 are due to restricting the effect of history dependence to be
linear. When the effect is estimated non-parametrically the inconsistencies disappear.
Figure A4 and A5 in the Appendix replicate Figure 2 for each region using Sample 1.
The pattern of transaction price and selling probability effects appears to be very similar
across regions.
Anchoring and down-payment requirement Mortgage debt has been increasing in
the UK up to the financial crisis in parallel with house prices (Bunn and Rostom, 2015).
Is there a relation between history dependence and household leverage? To answer this
question, we have to restrict our attention to Sample 2 —where we can distinguish between
properties purchased with cash and properties purchased with a mortgage—and Sample
3 —where we can distinguish, among the mortgaged properties, properties purchased
with a LTV greater than 80 (the median LTV in the Product Sales Data) from other
properties. Because our attention is on history dependence, in both cases these funding
information refer to the previous purchase of the property (at time s), not to the current
period being analyzed (t).7
We show results graphically in Figure 3 and 4 and in tabular form in Table A2 and
A3 in the Appendix.
6The probit specification is:
Prob(qt = 1) = Φ
[
Xβ + δt +
∑
k
γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et
]
For computational reasons, the probit regression is esitmated on a 10 (rather than 50) percent random
sample of the LR and does not include local-authority fixed effects.
7Hence we do not attempt to estimate the current LTV for the properties in our sample, but focus
exclusively on the LTV at the time of purchase.
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Figure 3: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses in Sample 2
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of Figure 2 but uses only Sample 2 observations and
runs the regression yt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0+f(DURt)+et separately for properties
that were bought with a mortgage and properties that were bought with cash. (Information
on whether the buyer used a mortgage to finance the transaction is available from the Land
Registry since 2002.) The precise value of the coefficients is reported in Table A2 and A3 in
the Appendix.
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Figure 4: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses in Sample 3
Notes: The charts replicate the analysis of Figure 2 but uses only Sample 3 observations and
runs the regression yt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0+f(DURt)+et separately for properties
that were bought with a high-LTV or a low-LTV mortgage, where the threshold LTV ratio is
80 percent. Information on the characteristics of mortgages is available from the Product Sales
Data (PSD) since March 2005. The match between Land Registry (LR) and PSD, described
in Appendix B.2, generates four subsets of Sample 3 : matched properties bought with a high
LTV, matched properties bought with a low LTV, properties that were bought with a mortgage
according to the LR but do not match with the PSD, and properties that were bought with
cash according to the LR. For the sake of clarity this figure only shows the coefficients on high-
and low-LTV properties, but Table A2 and A3 in the Appendix report the exact regression
coefficients for all four groups.
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Both for transaction prices and selling probabilities, Figure 3 shows that in all the
intervals considered the effect on properties bought with a mortgage is not statistically
different from the effect on properties bought with cash. In both analyses however the
point estimates for properties bought with a mortgage are always further from the zero
line than the coefficients for properties bought with cash. In the regression on selling
probabilities, most of the the coefficients corresponding to properties bought with cash
are not statistically different from zero.
The analysis on Sample 3 allows us to highlight the effect of properties bought with
a high leverage (properties bought with an LTV higher than 80 percent). Similar to the
analysis of Sample2, the effect on highly leveraged properties is larger than on properties
bought with a low LTV across the whole range of possible capital gains. However, for
individual coefficients across the distribution of gains and losses, we cannot significantly
reject the null of equal effects.
The post-2007 fall in transactions Can the results on history dependence be related
to the fall in housing market activity that occurred in the England and Wales after 2007?
As shown in Figure 1, the aggregate number of transactions did not return to its pre-
crisis level even after seven years, in 2014. To answer this question, we first compare
the distribution of ongoing capital gains in the two periods, 2001-2007 and 2008-2014.
Figure 5 shows there were practically no losses in the 2001-2007 period, and the bulk of
properties was in the 0-100 percent capital gain interval. By contrast, in 2008-2014 a few
properties were experiencing potential losses and many other properties had gains close
to zero.
In 2001-2007 the average annual selling probability for a property was 7.7 percent;
this probability fell to 3.3 percent in the 2008-2014 period. To compute the contribu-
tion of history dependence to this fall, we first calculate the change in each of the bins
of the gain distribution between the two periods, then multiply these differences by the
coefficients obtained from the regression on selling probabilities and shown in the lower
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Figure 5: Distribution of ongoing capital gains, pre and post crisis
Notes: The charts show the distribution of the GAINt variable in two subperiods: 2001-2007
and 2008-2014. The bin width replicates the allocation of dummy variables used to split GAINt
and compute the coefficients shown in Figure 2, 3, and 4. For each property, GAINt is computed
as the difference between the current estimated log house price index and the log index when the
house was purchased. The indices are calculated at the local authority level. The distributions
are estimated for the analyisis of selling probabilities and hence GAINt is computed for each
property in each year since it first appeared in the Land Registry—these are ongoing rather
than realized gains.
half of Figure 2. By summing all these numbers we get the total contribution, in per-
centage points, of history depdence to the fall in transactions: -0.4. Since the total fall
in transactions between the two periods was 4.4 percentage points, history dependence
explains 9.3 percent of the fall. If we repeat the analysis using the results from the probit
regression we get a 13 percent explanatory power.
5 Extensions: listing prices and time on the market
In this section we study history dependence in the selling decision process, not just on
the outcomes. The analysis is based on data from WhenFresh, a company that collects
all daily listings from Zoopla, a major UK property portal. Using this source allows us
to study listing prices and time on the market for properties that were advertised for sale
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in England and Wales after 2008. Many of these properties can be matched back to a
previous purchase on the LR. Some of these properties were later sold and recorded again
on the LR.
5.1 Data and summary statistics
Zoopla is the second UK property portal in terms of traffic. Its dataset starts in November
2008. In this paper we restrict our attention to sale listings where an address can be
precisely identified. The dataset contains information on the address of properties, listing
prices, and property attributes (such as property type and number of bedrooms).
Zoopla collects data only from estate agents, not individual sellers. In the UK,
most transactions occur via estate agents (in 2010, only 11 percent of homes were sold
privately—see Office of Fair Trading, 2010).
Similar to Table 1 and 2, Table 4 and 5 show the descriptive statistics for the When-
Fresh/Zoopla dataset. The tables contains two additional variables with respect to Table
1 and 2—the listing price and the number of bedrooms. Table 5 shows that the average
monthly selling probability once a property is advertised for sale on Zoopla is 8 percent.
5.2 History dependence in listing prices and time on the market
In this part of the paper we directly analyse the nonparametric results displayed in Figure
6, 7, and 8 which mirror Figure 2, 3, and 4 in the previous section.
The upper half of Figure 6 shows that properties that are experiencing a loss tend to
post a higher listing price; whereas properties that are experiencing a gain tend to post a
lower price. This is consistent with the analysis on actual prices in the previous section.
However, to compare the size of the effect on listing and actual prices we need to restrict
the analyis of listing prices to properties that actually sold, and restrict the analysis of
actual prices to properties that were advertised on Zoopla. Figure A7 in the Appendix
shows this comparison: effects are almost identical, suggesting that price discounts are
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Table 4: WhenFresh/Zoopla summary statistics, analysis of listing prices
Notes: The first column shows the statistics for the subset of WhenFresh/Zoopla listings used in the
analysis of listing prices, Sample Z1. These are listings for which it was possible to retrieve a previous
purchase in the Land Registry (LR) (the matching procedure is described in Appendix B.3). The second
column describes Sample Z2, a subset of Sample Z1 for which the previous LR purchase happened
after 2001 allowing us to determine whether the property was purchased with a mortgage. The third
column includes information on Sample Z3, which includes sale listings of properties purchased after
March 2005. For some of these properties we are able to retrieve the details of the mortgage used in the
previous purchase through the Product Sale Data by the Financial Conduct Authority.
Sample Z1 Sample Z2 Sample Z3
(previous LR record (previous LR record (previous LR record
in 1995-2014) in 2002-2014) in 2005-2014)
Listings (N) 2,601,406 1,994,043 1,383,014
Properties 2,040,936 1,566,850 1,099,869
Listing price (lt)
Mean 232,658 228,625 229,184
p1 59,950 59,950 59,950
p25 130,000 129,950 129,995
p50 185,000 180,000 180,000
p75 275,000 269,950 269,950
p99 925,000 900,000 925,000
Property type (%)
Flat 0.16 0.18 0.19
Terraced 0.32 0.33 0.33
Semi 0.29 0.29 0.28
Detached 0.23 0.21 0.19
Bedrooms 2.84 2.79 2.75
Lease 0.21 0.23 0.24
New 0.10 0.10 0.10
Capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.28 0.09 0.01
p1 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21
p25 -0.00 -0.03 -0.07
p50 0.11 0.04 0.00
p75 0.54 0.17 0.06
p99 1.27 0.66 0.40
Years since last purchase (DURt)
Mean 6.68 4.96 3.69
p1 0 0 0
p25 3 3 2
p50 6 5 4
p75 9 7 5
p99 17 11 8
Matched-in variables (means)
Bought with mortgage 0.77 0.77
Bought with LTV>80% 0.28
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Table 5: WhenFresh/Zoopla summary statistics, analysis of time on the market
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics of the dataset used to analyze the time on market of
properties advertised for sale on the Zoopla property portal. The dataset is created by taking the
WhenFresh/Zoopla samples (whose descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4) and expanding them
so that each advertised property has an observation in each month since its appearance on Zoopla
until its sale or withdrawal. (We truncate the number of month at 12 when there is no sale.) The
three columns in the table correspond to the same three samples of the data as described in Table 4.
Sample Z1 Sample Z2 Sample Z3
(previous LR record (previous LR record (previous LR record
in 1995-2014) in 2002-2014) in 2005-2014)
Sales 1,127,866 841,038 570,885
Listings 2,040,936 1,566,850 1,099,869
Listings × month obs (N) 13,800,249 10,489,683 7,158,092
Monthly sell prob (Sales/N) 0.08 0.08 0.08
Property type (%)
Flat 0.16 0.18 0.20
Terraced 0.31 0.32 0.33
Semi 0.28 0.27 0.27
Detached 0.24 0.22 0.20
Bedrooms 2.86 2.81 2.76
Lease 0.22 0.24 0.25
Capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.28 0.08 -0.00
p1 -0.20 -0.20 -0.21
p25 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08
p50 0.10 0.03 -0.01
p75 0.56 0.17 0.05
p99 1.26 0.66 0.36
Months since listing (DURt)
Mean 4.40 4.39 4.36
p1 1 1 1
p25 2 2 2
p50 4 4 4
p75 6 6 6
p99 12 12 12
Matched-in variables (means)
Bought with mortgage 0.77 0.77
Bought with LTV>80% 0.28
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similar along the range of capital gains. This seems to indicate a strong bargaining power
of the seller in the England and Wales housing market—history dependence comes from
sellers and does not appear to be dampened by market forces.
With listing data we can check whether historical conditions influence the hazard
rate at which a house sells once it has been advertised on the property portal—results
are shown in the lower half of Figure 6. Similar to the analysis of unconditional selling
probabilities, we expand the WhenFresh/Zoopla samples so that each property-month
combination has its row, and construct a dummy variable which equals one only when
the property is matched with a LR transaction because it was sold. We cut the number
of months at 12 to avoid cases in which property listings are simply ‘forgotten’ on the
website. As shown in the lower half of Figure 6, the regression outcome similar to the
analysis of unconditional selling probabilities, but the effect does not fade for large gains.
The trends seems to be more decisively upwards.
Comparing the effect on properties bought with a mortgage with properties bought
with cash, or the effect on properties bought with a high-LTV mortgages with other
properties, gives similar results to the analysis shown in the previous section. Leveraged
properties show larger effects on the whole range of gains, but the effects are never
statistically different from those on non-leveraged properties.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates history dependence in the housing market using the universe
of housing transactions in England and Wales in the last twenty years. We find that
aggregate house prices in the year a house was previously bought influence the individual
price at which the house sells next, as well as the probability that the transaction takes
place. The evidence appears to be consistent with the presence of anchoring effects. Our
data allow us to separate properties which were bought with a mortgage and properties
which were bought with cash. For a subsample of the data, we can also separate out
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Figure 6: Effects of gains and losses on listing prices and time on the market
Notes: The two charts upper the coefficients and associated 95-percent confidence bands on the
GAINkt dummy variables in the regression yt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0+f(DURt)+et.
The dependent variable is the property listing price (lt) in the upper chart and a monthly sell-
ing indicator (ht) in the bottom chart. The data on listings come from the WhenFresh/Zoopla
dataset and was merged with the Land Registry (LR) to compute gains, holding period and
whether a listing translates into a sale (for the analysis of time on the market in the bot-
tom chart). The confidence bands in the chart are computed through standard errors double
clustered by year and local authority. The detailed coefficients on the GAINkt variables are
reported in the Appendix Tables A4 and A5.
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Figure 7: Effects of gains and losses on properties purchased with a mortgage or cash
Notes: The two charts replicate the analysis of Figure 6 in the context of Sample Z2, running
separate regressions for properties that were purchased with a mortgage and properties that
were bought with cash. (Information on whether the buyer used a mortgage to finance the
transaction is available from the Land Registry since 2002.) The confidence bands in the chart
are computed through standard errors which are double clustered by year and local authority.
The detailed coefficients on the GAINkt variables are reported in the Appendix Tables A4 and
A5.
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Figure 8: Effects of gains and losses on properties bought with a high- or low-LTV
mortgage
Notes: The two charts replicate the analysis of Figure 6 in the context of Sample Z3, running
separate regressions for properties that were bought with a high-LTV or a low-LTV mortgage,
where the threshold LTV ratio is 80 percent. Information on the characteristics of mortgages
is available from the Product Sales Data (PSD) since March 2005. The match between Land
Registry (LR) and PSD, described in Appendix B.2, generates four subsets of Sample Z3 :
matched properties bought with a high LTV, matched properties bought with a low LTV,
properties that were bought with a mortgage according to the LR but do not match with the
PSD, and properties that were bought with cash according to the LR. For the sake of clarity
this figure only shows the coefficients on high- and low-LTV properties, but Table A2 and A3
in the Appendix report the exact regression coefficients for all four groups.
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properties which were bought with a high-LTV mortgage. While point estimates of
the history dependence effects are larger for houses financed through a mortgage and in
particular high-LTV ones, consistent with downpayment effects as in Stein (1995), a large
part of the effects is independent of leverage and seems to be driven by simple anchoring
as in Tversky and Kahneman (1982). We find virtually no evidence of asymmetric effects
in anchoring; in particular, we do not find evidence of loss aversion as a driver of history
dependence, not least because nominal losses were limited during the period we analyze.
We find similar evidence of history dependence for advertised prices and this signif-
icantly affects time on the market. Sellers appear to have enough bargaining power to
pass through a significant part of their history premia to transaction prices.
Our findings raise interesting challenges for the role of policy in an environment in
which people have nominal anchors. In particular, while higher house price inflation
could spur more housing market activity today, it raises the need to keep inflation high
(and possibly higher) in the future, feeding in the unsettling need for potentially spiraling
house price growth.
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A Appendix: Additional figures
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Figure A1: Local house prices
Notes: Quality-adjusted aggregate house prices for this paper are estimated using 1995-2014
Land Registry data from England and Wales. The lines in the charts plot the δt coefficients from
the regression pit = Xiβ + δt + eit run for each local authority in England and Wales, where Xi
is a vector of housing characteristics included in the Land Registry: type of property, whether
the property is new, and whether the property is sold under a leasehold arrangement. In the
figure local aggregate house prices are grouped by region to highlight within-region variation.
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Figure A2: Estimation samples for the analysis of transaction prices
Notes: The charts show graphically the composition of the samples used in the analysis of
transaction prices and described in Table 1. The samples are overlapped on light grey bars
which represent all the sales included in the England and Wales Land Registry. Sample 1
is made of all properties which have at least two sales in the dataset, and excludes for each
property the first of such sales. (The first sale is used to include the previous price or the
previous aggregate price index in the main regression.) Sample 2 is a subset of Sample 1 and
refers to properties whose first sale took place after 2001. For this sample we can tell whether
the property was purchased with a mortgage. Sample 3 is a subset of Sample 2 and refers to
properties whose first sale took place after March 2005 and can potentially be matched to the
Product Sales Data (PSD), a dataset of residential mortgages where we can identify the initial
LTV with which a house was bought.
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Figure A3: Estimation samples for the analysis of selling probabilities
Notes: The charts show graphically the composition of the samples used in the analysis of selling
probabilities and described in Table 2. The samples are made of property-by-year observations.
The light grey bars represent sales included in the England and Wales Land Registry (LR)
where a property appears for the first time. After that event the dataset ‘follows’ the property
in each year, assigning it a binary variable which indicates whether the property was sold
(qt = {0, 1}). Sample 1 is made of property-by-year observations generated by every property
which appeared in the LR. The first sale (observation) for each property does not belong to
the sample (conceptually it belongs to a previous unobserved spell that ended with the sale).
Sample 2 is a subset of Sample 1 and refers to properties whose LR first sale took place after
2001. For this sample we can tell whether the property was purchased with a mortgage. Sample
3 is a subset of Sample 2 and refers to properties whose LR first sale took place after March
2005 and can potentially be matched to the Product Sales Data (PSD), a dataset of residential
mortgages where we can identify the initial LTV with which a house was bought. The property-
by-year format of the dataset requires increasing computational resources; this figure refers to
the 50% random sample of the LR that is used in the analysis of the paper.
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Figure A4: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses on transaction prices, by region
Notes: The charts replicate the Sample 1 analysis of the upper half of Figure 2 for each
region in England Wales. The charts show the coefficients and associated confidence bands
for the k dummy variables associated with different gains/losses (GAINkt’s) in the regression
pt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0+f(DURt)+et, run separately for each region. Regressions
have year-by-local authority fixed effects and standard errors are double-clustered by year and
local auhority.
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Figure A5: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses on selling probabilities, by region
Notes: The charts replicate the Sample 1 analysis of the bottom half of Figure 2 for each
region in England Wales. The charts show the coefficients and associated confidence bands
for the k dummy variables associated with different gains/losses (GAINkt’s) in the regression
qt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0+f(DURt)+et, run separately for each region. Regressions
have year-by-local authority fixed effects and standard errors are double-clustered by year and
local auhority.
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Figure A6: Nonlinear effects of gains and losses on selling probabilities, probit regression
Notes: The chart replicates the lower half of Figure 2 using a probit (Prob(qt = 1) =
Φ [Xβ + δt +
∑
k γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et]) instead of an OLS regression, and shows
marginal effects estimated at the means of regression variables. For computational reasons, the
probit regression is esitmated on a 10 (rather than 50) percent random sample of the LR, does
not include local-authority fixed effects, and standard errors are computed without clustering.
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Figure A7: Analysis of matched listing and actual prices
Notes: The chart shows the effect of gains and losses on listing prices and actual realized prices
for a subset of properties which were advertised on Zoopla (a subgroup of Sample Z1 ) and then
sold and recorded on the LR (a subgroup of Sample 1 ). Similarly to other figures in the paper,
the chart contains the coefficients and associated confidence bands on the GAINkt dummy
variables in the regression yt = Xβ + δt +
∑
k γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et, where yt is
either the listing price (lt) or the actual sale price (pt). The confidence bands in the chart are
computed through standard errors double clustered by year and local authority.
40
A.1 Additional tables
Table A1: Robustness regressions
Notes: This table replicates the analysis of Table 3 for two subsets of the data: flats and
properties which were bought new. The upper panel of the table reports results for the
transaction price analysis and the bottom half of the table reports results for the selling
probability analysis. In each of the two panels, coefficients refer to a regression of the form
yt = Xβ + δt + γ1δˆs + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + εt, where yt is either the transaction price or a binary
indicator of whether a transaction is taking place for a given property in any given year (we omit
the individual subscript i for simplicity). Standard errors in parentheses are double-clustered
by local authority and year.
Dependent variable: Transacted price (pt)
Sample 1 (1995-2014) Sample 2 (2002-2014) Sample 3 (2005-2014)
Flats Bought new Flats Bought new Flats Bought new
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Previous aggr.
factor (δˆs)
0.045 0.207 0.142 0.234 0.109 0.248
(0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.026) (0.030) (0.048)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 1,445,912 838,622 697,269 323,861 326,547 133,630
Dependent variable: Selling probability (qt)
Sample 1 (1995-2014) Sample 2 (2002-2014) Sample 3 (2005-2014)
Flats Bought new Flats Bought new Flats Bought new
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Previous aggr.
factor (δˆs)
-0.003 -0.004 -0.032 -0.025 -0.061 -0.054
(0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 10,686,747 7,055,918 6,273,728 3,364,024 3,647,561 1,847,214
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Table A2: Effects of gains and losses on transaction prices
Notes: The table contains the coefficients and standard errors for the k dummy variables asso-
ciated with different gains/losses (GAINkt’s) in the regression pt = Xβ+ δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+
γ2pˆ0 +f(DURt)+et, where pt is the transaction price. The coefficients are displayed graphically
with their 95 percent confidence bands in the upper half of Figure 2 (column 1, 2, and 5) , 3
(column 3 and 4), and 4 (column 6 and 7). Column 3 and 4 show regression results separately
for properties that were bought with a mortgage and properties that were bought with cash.
(Information on whether the buyer used a mortgage to finance the transaction is available from
the Land Registry since 2002.) Column 6-9 show regression results for properties that were
bought with a loan-to-value ration (LTV) greater than 80, properties that were bought with
an LTV lower than 80, properties that were bought with a mortgage according to the Land
Registry (LR) but do not match with the PSD, and properties that were bought with cash
according to the LR. The latter division of Sample 3 into subgroups depends on the match
between LR and PSD which is described in Appendix B.2. Standard errors double-clustered at
the year and local-authority level in parentheses.
Dependent variable: Transaction price (pt)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
Mortgage
All All Cash Mortgage All High-LTV Low-LTV no match Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gain [-.25,-.15] 0.022 0.023 0.027 0.014 0.023 0.042 0.031 0.003 0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.003)
Gain [-.15,-.05] 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.008 0.016 0.022 0.015 0.016 0.016
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain [.05,.15] -0.034 -0.023 -0.028 -0.014 -0.016 -0.018 -0.013 -0.016 -0.011
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Gain [.15,.25] -0.060 -0.046 -0.050 -0.040 -0.038 -0.037 -0.030 -0.041 -0.041
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
Gain [.25,.35] -0.080 -0.056 -0.061 -0.049 -0.052 -0.053 -0.041 -0.066 -0.057
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Gain [.35,.45] -0.089 -0.062 -0.069 -0.051 -0.068 -0.076 -0.055 -0.092 -0.051
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.015)
Gain [.45,.55] -0.096 -0.074 -0.082 -0.060 -0.082 -0.089 -0.073 -0.105 -0.060
(0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011)
Gain [.55,.65] -0.099 -0.077 -0.088 -0.059 -0.088 -0.099 -0.087 -0.097 -0.069
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007)
Gain [.65,.75] -0.101 -0.083 -0.096 -0.058 -0.110 -0.121 -0.118 -0.135 -0.061
(0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) (0.048)
Gain [.75,.85] -0.105 -0.083 -0.103 -0.042 -0.088 -0.130 -0.094 -0.080 -0.010
(0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013)
Gain [.85,.95] -0.107 -0.095 -0.120 -0.046 -0.041 -0.138 -0.092 -0.093 0.141
(0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.026)
Gain [.95,1.05] -0.113 -0.107 -0.137 -0.053
(0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025)
Gain [1.05,1.15] -0.118 -0.105 -0.113 -0.097
(0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022)
Gain [1.15,1.25] -0.125
(0.028)
Gain [1.25,1.35] -0.131
(0.029)
Gain [1.35,1.45] -0.125
(0.029)
Gain [1.45,1.55] -0.130
(0.030)
Gain [1.55,1.65] -0.146
(0.035)
Gain [1.65,1.75] -0.117
(0.030)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 7,525,439 3,197,753 2,298,449 899,304 1,384,017 376,802 365,966 236,794 404,455
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Table A3: Effects of gains and losses on selling probabilities
Notes: The table is analogous to Table ?? but refers to the regression qt = Xβ + δt +∑
k γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et, where qt is a binary indicator of sale. The coeffi-
cients are displayed graphically with their 95 percent confidence bands in the lower half of
Figure 2 (column 1, 2, and 5) , 3 (column 3 and 4), and 3 (column 6 and 7). All regressions
control for property type as measured by the Land Registry (X: flat, terrached, semi-detached
or detached property; new or second-hand property; property sold as leasehold or freehold) and
for a nonparametric function (a third-degree polynomial) of the number ofyears between sales
(DURt). Regressions have year-by-local authority fixed effects (δt in the regression formula)
and standard errors are double-clustered by year and local auhority.
Dependent variable: Selling probability (qt)
Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3
(1995-2014) (2002-2014) (2005-2014)
Mortgage
All All Cash Mortgage All High-LTV Low-LTV no match Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gain [-.25,-.15] -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.004 -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [-.15,-.05] -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.05,.15] 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.15,.25] 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.015 0.004 0.009 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.25,.35] 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.002 0.012 0.018 0.008 0.012 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Gain [.35,.45] 0.015 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.015 0.018 0.014 0.012 0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Gain [.45,.55] 0.014 0.005 0.008 -0.002 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Gain [.55,.65] 0.011 0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.010
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Gain [.65,.75] 0.008 0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.010 0.005 0.011 0.004 0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gain [.75,.85] 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.010 0.013 0.018 0.007 0.011 0.012
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002)
Gain [.85,.95] 0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.014 0.010 0.016 0.011 0.001 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Gain [.95,1.05] 0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.020
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Gain [1.05,1.15] -0.000 -0.008 -0.003 -0.020
(0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)
Gain [1.15,1.25] -0.001
(0.003)
Gain [1.25,1.35] -0.003
(0.003)
Gain [1.35,1.45] -0.005
(0.004)
Gain [1.45,1.55] -0.006
(0.003)
Gain [1.55,1.65] -0.010
(0.004)
Gain [1.65,1.75] -0.015
(0.004)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 68,872,541 33,788,935 24,693,241 9,095,694 18,130,348 4,815,413 5,241,343 3,433,296 4,640,296
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Table A4: Effects of gains and losses on lisitng prices
Notes: The regressions are similar to those in Table A2 but with WhenFresh/Zoopla listing
prices (lt) as the dependent variable: lt = Xβ+δt+
∑
k γ1kGAINkt+γ2pˆ0 +f(DURt)+et. The
coefficients are displayed graphically with their 95 percent confidence bands in the upper half of
Figure 6 (column 1, 2, and 5) , 7 (column 3 and 4), and 8 (column 6 and 7). Column 3 and 4 show
regression results separately for properties that were bought with a mortgage and properties
that were bought with cash. Column 6-9 show regression results for properties that were bought
with a loan-to-value ration (LTV) greater than 80, properties that were bought with an LTV
lower than 80, properties that were bought with a mortgage according to the Land Registry (LR)
but do not match with the PSD, and properties that were bought with cash according to the
LR. Standard errors in parentheses are double-clustered at the year and local-authority level.
Dependent variable: Listing price (lt)
Sample Z1 Sample Z2 Sample Z3
(Previous LR record (Previous LR record (Previous LR record
in 1995-2014) in 2002-2014) in 2005-2014)
Mortgage
All All Cash Mortgage All High-LTV Low-LTV no match Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gain [-.25,-.15] 0.019 0.018 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.028 0.013 -0.004 0.021
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
Gain [-.15,-.05] 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.009 0.003 0.013
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Gain [.05,.15] -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Gain [.15,.25] -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 -0.012 -0.020 -0.011 -0.018 -0.017
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain [.25,.35] -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.021 -0.011 -0.025 -0.010 -0.013 -0.025
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Gain [.35,.45] -0.018 -0.018 -0.023 -0.016 -0.019 -0.040 -0.016 -0.042 -0.015
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)
Gain [.45,.55] -0.019 -0.028 -0.033 -0.024 -0.025 -0.042 -0.026 -0.074 -0.013
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.013)
Gain [.55,.65] -0.019 -0.027 -0.034 -0.022 -0.034 -0.063 -0.032 -0.060 -0.050
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008)
Gain [.65,.75] -0.023 -0.037 -0.044 -0.033 -0.039 -0.081 -0.032 -0.083 -0.005
(0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.021) (0.013)
Gain [.75,.85] -0.019 -0.046 -0.065 -0.006 -0.052 -0.117 -0.042 -0.110 -0.004
(0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.046) (0.013) (0.010) (0.033)
Gain [.85,.95] -0.017 -0.072 -0.098 -0.016 -0.111 -0.107 -0.124 -0.116 -0.072
(0.008) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016)
Gain [.95,1.05] -0.018 -0.076 -0.108 -0.012
(0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Gain [1.05,1.15] -0.026 -0.080 -0.135 -0.004
(0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013)
Gain [1.15,1.25] -0.034
(0.011)
Gain [1.25,1.35] -0.042
(0.012)
Gain [1.35,1.45] -0.039
(0.012)
Gain [1.45,1.55] -0.045
(0.013)
Gain [1.55,1.65] -0.055
(0.016)
Gain [1.65,1.75] -0.045
(0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 2,597,866 1,991,038 1,532,353 458,685 1,380,009 446,460 933,549 210,693 315,186
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Table A5: Effects on monthly selling probabilities once listed
Notes: The regressions are similar to those in Table A3 but with an indicator of whether the
property advertised for sale on Zoopla has been sold in any given month (ht) as the dependent
variable: ht = Xβ + δt +
∑
k γ1kGAINkt + γ2pˆ0 + f(DURt) + et. The coefficients are displayed
graphically with their 95 percent confidence bands in the lower half of Figure 6 (column 1, 2, and
5) , 7 (column 3 and 4), and 8 (column 6 and 7). Regressions have year-by-local authority fixed
effects (δt in the regression formula) and standard errors are double-clustered by year and local
authority. Standard errors in parentheses are double-clustered at the year and local-authority
level.
Dependent variable: Monthly selling probability once listed (ht)
Sample Z1 Sample Z2 Sample Z3
(Previous LR record (Previous LR record (Previous LR record
in 1995-2014) in 2002-2014) in 2005-2014)
Mortgage
All Cash All Mortgage All High-LTV Low-LTV no match Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Gain [-.25,-.15] -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.017 -0.020 -0.015 -0.012 -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Gain [-.15,-.05] -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.012 -0.014 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain [.05,.15] 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.015
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gain [.15,.25] 0.014 0.016 0.017 0.012 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.023 0.027
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Gain [.25,.35] 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.035 0.032 0.038 0.024 0.035
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Gain [.35,.45] 0.017 0.019 0.021 0.015 0.041 0.029 0.048 0.029 0.048
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Gain [.45,.55] 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.014 0.044 0.034 0.053 0.027 0.049
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.006)
Gain [.55,.65] 0.021 0.018 0.019 0.012 0.043 0.037 0.047 0.018 0.054
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.011)
Gain [.65,.75] 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.015 0.046 0.029 0.057 0.025 0.047
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010) (0.007)
Gain [.75,.85] 0.026 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.031 0.036 -0.017 0.008 0.062
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.032) (0.013)
Gain [.85,.95] 0.030 0.026 0.029 0.012 0.053 0.007 0.018 0.063 0.063
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010)
Gain [.95,1.05] 0.033 -0.005 0.001 -0.028
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Gain [1.05,1.15] 0.037 0.025 0.039 -0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Gain [1.15,1.25] 0.041
(0.011)
Gain [1.25,1.35] 0.040
(0.011)
Gain [1.35,1.45] 0.038
(0.013)
Gain [1.45,1.55] 0.037
(0.009)
Gain [1.55,1.65] 0.029
(0.012)
Gain [1.65,1.75] 0.033
(0.019)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Idiosyncratic factor (pˆ0) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed effects Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA Y×LA
N 13,778,554 10,470,053 8,030,645 2,439,408 7,138,462 2,305,677 2,088,638 1,102,618 1,641,529
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B Matched-in data sources
B.1 Mortgage v cash additional LR variable
Information on funding of housing transactions can be purchased from the LR. The LR
provides a file with complete address, price paid and Deed date, (but no transaction ID)
which we watch to the publicly available LR dataset.
Figure A8 shows that the total number of cash purchases in England and Wales is
less cyclical than the number of mortgages.
Table A6 shows some descriptive statistics for Sample 2 grouping properties by fund-
ing source (mortgage or cash). Properties bought with cash are usually less expensive,
except at the top of the price distribution (above the 99th percentile).
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Figure A8: Mortgage vs non-mortgage purchases, 2002-2014
Notes: The bars represent the number of sales in the England and Wales Land Registry (LR)
since information on the funding of housing transaction has ben available (2002). This informa-
tion is collected in a variable denoted ‘charge’, which indicates whether an additional ownership
claim (on top of the owner’s) is present on the property in question.
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Table A6: Summary statistics: bought with a mortgage vs bought with cash
Notes: This table repeats the analysis of the upper half of Table 1, focusing on Sample 2 and
contrasting properties that were bought with a mortgage with properties that were bought with
cash.
Sample 2
(previous purchase in 2002-2014)
Bought with a mortgage Bought with cash
Sales 2,299,688 899,701
Properties 1,941,359 811,728
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 214,981 204,092
p1 49,500 27,000
p25 121,000 110,000
p50 168,950 159,950
p75 245,000 235,000
p99 925,000 940,000
Property type (%)
Flat 0.22 0.25
Terraced 0.34 0.31
Semi 0.26 0.23
Detached 0.19 0.22
Lease 0.27 0.30
New 0.00 0.00
Log capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.18 0.16
Median 0.14 0.10
p01 -0.16 -0.16
p10 -0.04 -0.03
p90 0.47 0.46
p99 0.75 0.75
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 3.74 3.13
p01 0 0
p10 1 0
p50 3 2
p90 8 8
p99 11 11
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B.2 Mortgage information from the Product Sale Data
To match in information on mortgages from the PSD to the LR we perform a record
linkage exercise between the two datasets.
Data preparation As a preliminary step, we restrict the PSD to initial mortgages and
exclude remortgages; we limit the sample to England and Wales and exclude Scotland
and Northern Ireland. These exclusions leave us with a dataset of 6.2m observations
between 31 March 2005 (the start day of the PSD data collection) and 31 December 2014
(the end of the sample analysed in this paper). We call this dataset Relevant PSD. In the
same period, the LR contains 8.3m observations. Since we can identify which LR sales
were funded with a mortgage, we restrict our attention to those, leading to a reduction of
the relevant LR observations to 6.3m, a number similar to the size of the Relevant PSD.
The LR contains information on:
• sale price
• address
• sale date (completion)
• type of property
The PSD variables that could be related to LR information are:
• sale price or property value
• postcode
• date of mortgage account opening
• type of property.
In the Relevant PSD The sale price variable is missing for 2.3m sales, but the property
value variable is missing for only 554 observations. Comparing sale price with property
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value for records were both of these are non-missing reveals that the two numbers coincide
most of the times; hence we create a new price variable which equates the purchase price
when it is available, and the property value otherwise. In theory, the price variable should
match with the corresponding sale price in the LR. In practice, in a preliminary analysis
we tabulated all the specific values of price found in the PSD, compared them with all
the individual sale prices found in the LR, and found that around 30% of price values
found in the PSD are not found in the LR.8
The postcode variable is never missing in the PSD. As a preliminary step in the
analysis, we found that around 90% of postcodes found in the PSD are found in the
LR—a better result than the one on prices.9
The date in which a bank transfer the mortgage amount to the buyer is the completion
date or a few days before. Figure A9 shows that, on a monthly scale, there is a 1:1 relation
between observations in the LR and the PSD.
Finally, data on property type are missing for 40 percent of the observations in the
PSD, hence we do not use them for the matching.
Data matching We assign an ID to every combination of postcode, date, and price in
the LR and the PSD.10 We proceed in steps, from the best matches to less precise ones:
1. We first select observations that match on all three variables (postcode, date, and
price)—there are 1.5m of them. We create a variable indicating matching quality
and assign these observations the maximum value (4). We then remove their IDs
from the list of LR and PSD observations to be matched.
2. We select observations that match on postcode and price, which sometimes results
in multiple matches (the same combination of postcode and price can be associated
with different dates). For each LR ID, we select the observation where the distance
8Manual inspection of those prices revealed no noteworthy pattern. Their distribution was similar to
the price distribution in the LR.
9Again, manual inspection of non-matching postcodes revealed no noteworthy pattern.
10There are around 60,000 duplicates in postcode, date, and price in both the LR and the PSD,
corresponding to 1 percent of observations. We eliminate duplicates before proceeding.
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Figure A9: Number of observations by month in the Land Registry and Product Sale
Data before matching
Notes: The Land Registry (LR) sample is made of all England and Wales registered sales
between March 2005 and the end of 2014. The PSD sample is made of all mortgages for house
purchase (excluding remortgages) in England and Wales for the same period. (The PSD started
to collect data on mortgages on April 1st, 2005. We keep March 2005 sales in the LR because
we allow for a maximum difference of 30 days, in both directions, between the sale date in the
LR and the mortgage starting date in the PSD.)
between the LR and PSD date is the lowest, limiting the selection to instances
where this distance does not exceed 30 days. We do the same for each PSD ID.
Once we have a group of uniquely matched IDs (in this case, 2.5m sales), we assign
them match quality 3 and remove them from the list of IDs that still need to be
matched.
3. We select observations that match on postcode and date. We eliminate duplicate
IDs similarly to the previous step, by selecting for each ID the observation where
the percentage difference between the LR and PSD price is the lowest, limiting
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the selection to differences of plus or minus 10 percent. This step of the process
produces 150,000 additional matches with match quality 2.
4. Finally, we create all the combinations of the remaining observations that match
on postcode only. Within duplicates observations of the same ID, we select the
observation with the lowest date difference. If there are ties, we select the obser-
vation with the lowest price difference. All the observations where the differences
between variables exceed the thresholds (30 days for dates, 10 percent for prices)
are eliminated. This step produces 270,000 additional matches with quality 1.11
There are in total 4,540,412 matched sales, which correspond to 73 percent of all PSD
mortgages. In the paper, we show results based on matches with qualities from 4 to 1.
Running the analysis only on matches with quality 4 to 3 yields almost identical results
(this group corresponds to 90 percent of matched properties).
Descriptive statistics of matching results Table A7 shows the characteristics of
properties in Sample 3 (transaction price analysis). The aggregate statistics for this
sample are showed in the third column of the upper half of Table 1; this table splits
the sample into four groups: properties that match with the PSD and were purchased
with an initial LTV greater than 80 percent, properties that match with the PSD and
were purchased with an initial LTV lower or equal to 80 percent, properties that the LR
indicates as having been purchased with a mortgage but that do not match with the PSD,
and properties that according to the LR were bought with cash. In general, properties
purchased with a higher LTV are cheaper and have longer holding periods.
Figure A10 shows the distribution of mortgage LTVs in the relevant PSD dataset, the
subset of observations that match with the Land Registry, and the observations belonging
11This matching algorithm is implicitly assuming that postcodes exactly match. In other words, we
have not made any attempt to allow for errors in postcodes. To check whether these errors are likely to
be relevant, we joined the two datasets on price and date and then compared the postcodes in the LR
and PSD. If errors in postcodes were a relevant issue, we would expect to see several instances among
the combined observations where postcodes in the two datasets were similar but not identical. A visual
inspection of these observations revealed no such instances in the first 100 rows of the dataset.
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to Sample 3 used in the transaction price analysis. Spikes are apparent next to important
LTV values such as 75, 80, 85, 90 and 95 percent. This bunching is due to the way in
which UK mortgages are priced (see Best et al., 2015).
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Table A7: Summary statistics: Sample 3 subgroups generated by Land Registry-Product
Sales Data match
Notes: This table repeats the analysis of the upper half of Table 1, focusing on Sample 3 and
distinguishing between the four subgroups of sales which derived from the Land Registry (LR)-
Product Sales Data (PSD) match. The first two groups refer to repeat sales where the previous
purchase matches with a PSD mortgage: properties that were bought with a high LTV (>80%)
and properties that were bought with a low LTV. The third and the fourth group refer to repeat
sales where the previous purchase does not match with a PSD mortgage: either properties that
according to the LR were purchased with a mortgage (third column) or properties that according
to the LR were bought with cash (fourth column).
Sample 3
(previously purchased in 2005-2014)
Matched Not matched
Bought with Bought with Bought with Bought with
LTV>80% LTV≤80% Mortgage Cash
Sales 377,241 366,426 237,134 404,852
Properties 362,682 354,297 230,259 381,419
Current sale price (pt)
Mean 204,169 269,705 232,902 222,231
p1 60,000 68,000 43,000 41,000
p25 123,500 150,000 117,000 120,000
p50 166,000 208,000 167,500 168,950
p75 239,960 300,000 250,000 248,000
p99 765,000 1,250,000 1,300,000 1,100,000
Property type (%)
Flat 0.24 0.17 0.30 0.26
Terraced 0.39 0.29 0.34 0.28
Semi 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.24
Detached 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.22
Lease 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.31
New 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log capital gains (GAINt)
Mean 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03
p1 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18
p25 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02
p50 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
p75 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.07
p99 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.38
Years btw previous purchase and current sale (DURt)
Mean 3.82 3.60 2.81 2.51
p1 0 0 0 0
p25 2 2 1 0
p50 4 3 2 2
p75 6 5 5 4
p99 8 8 8 8
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Figure A10: LTV distributions in the Product Sales Data and the matched observations
Notes: The top chart reports the distribution of loan-to-value (LTV) ratios of mortgages for
house purchases in the Product Sales Data (PSD), which covers the universe of homeowner
mortgages since April 2005. The middle chart refers to the mortgages that match a sale in
the Land Registry (LR) according to the matching algorithm described in Appendix B.2. The
bottom chart reports the distribution of LTVs for purchases of properties that belong to Sample
3 in the analysis of LR transaction prices in this paper.
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B.3 Whenfresh/Zoopla data
The raw data is provided by data company WhenFresh and corresponds to all listings
appeared on property portal Zoopla. For each listing we would like to know:
1. whether the previous purchase of the property is on the LR, and
2. whether the listing attempt successfully resulted in a subsequent sale recorded in
the LR.
We perform two matches, which we call match 1 and match 2, corresponding to the two
objectives above. (An alternative and equivalent approach would be to perform just one
of the Zoopla-LR matches and then retrieve the other matches by exploiting repeat sales
in the LR).
Data cleaning We initially restrict the dataset to sale listings in England and Wales
with a complete address which appeared on the website in 2009-201412—this corresponds
to 6,861,663 observations. Excluding listings where the creation date is after the deletion
date or where the initial price or the number of bedrooms are missing brings the number
of observations to 6,770,311. In order to avoid duplicates, we eliminate listings on the
same address happening before 180 days of the first one—ending with 4,405,445 listings.
Furthermore, to avoid outliers we eliminate listings corresponding to the first and 99th
percentile of the listing price distribution. We have now 4,317,919 listings to be matched
with the LR.
Data matching Property addresses in the WhenFresh/Zoopla do not have the same
format as addresses in the LR. Moreover addresses are provided to Zoopla by estate
agents and may occasionally contain errors.
After trying different matching approaches, we obtained the best performance by
requiring an exact match on (1) the two postcodes (the one in the LR and the one in the
12Zoopla was launched in November 2008 but given that most of our specifications are based on local
authority × year fixed effects, 2008 observations are too sparse to be used.
55
WhenFresh/Zoopla dataset) and (2) the first part of the address, which corresponds to
the street number for a house and the appartment number for a flat. The combination
of these two variables is likely to identify a unique property,13 allowing us to sidestep the
problem of complete addresses being written in different formats.
The combination of property address and listing date identifies a listing in the When-
Fresh/Zoopla dataset. After having joined the two dataset through postcode and the first
part of the address, duplicates in listings and LR sales still exist. In the context of match
1, we eliminate all combinations where the listing date occurs before the LR date, and
then we choose the match where the two dates are closest—we end up with 2,610,073.
For match 2, we only keep combinations where the listing date occurs before the LR
sale date and keep the observations where the distance in days between the two days is
shortest. Furthermore, we eliminate all instances where the sale occurred more than one
year after the first listing, because it becomes less clear whether these two events should
be grouped together as the same sale attempt.
13A complete UK postcode identifies around 10-15 units. In theory, for postcodes encompassing more
than one street, the combination postcode-street number would not be sufficient to identify a unit; a
similar issue would occur for two apartment small buildings being located in the same postcode and
using the same apartment numbering convention. In practice, visual inspection of the matching results
demonstrated that these instances are extremely rare, at least within the group of observations and the
time frame which are relevant for us.
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